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Abstract 
In this paper, I review, analyze, and evaluate the myriad ways 
early canonical and more recent high-profile scholarship in the 
field of sexualities envision a liberatory sexual politics and the 
most fruitful modes of achieving it. Due to theorists’ diverging 
interpretations of the causes and forms of sexual oppression as 
well as their differing visions of liberated sexuality, I find that 
prescriptions for dismantling the “ethnosexual regime” (Nagel 
2000) vary widely. The strategies suggested by scholars can be 
categorized into: 1) radical lesbian-feminist separatism, 2) 
identity politics, 3) the redeployment of gender, which 
encompasses trans and intersex bodies, gender play (e.g., 
butch-femme, drag, and shifting constructions of masculinity), 
and non-binary identities, 4) micro-level individual and 
interpersonal solutions, 5) changes in educational institutions, 
and 6) sexualities research itself. I conclude by making 
suggestions for sociologists who seek to further theorize and 
effect the subversion of normative systems of sexuality.  
Introduction 
Implicit in much sexualities research is the belief that another 
world is possible, one free from sexual regulation, oppression, 
persecution, and violence. While nearly all scholars of sexualities 
identify problems in the contemporary social organization of 
sexuality, they differ in their estimations of the causes and solutions 
to these issues. This paper is a qualitative meta-analytic review of 
the ways early canonical and more recent high-profile scholarship in 
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the field of sexualities link sexuality to power. I find that 
prescriptions for dismantling the “ethnosexual regime” (Nagel 2000) 
vary widely based on scholars’ ideologies of gender oppression, 
agency, power, and race. I conclude by making suggestions for 
sociologists who seek to further theorize and effect the subversion 
of normative systems of sexuality.  
Theorizing Sexualities, Race and Power 
Social scientists and lay people alike have conceptualized power 
as a repressive force, exercised through authority and coercion 
(Weber 1978; Green 2013; Foucault 1990). In theorizing sexuality 
and power, radical feminist theorists have advanced a theory of 
repressive power which defines all sexuality as oppressive to 
women, for the benefit of men (Dworkin 1997; Jeffreys 1996; 
MacKinnon 2001). In these formulations, there is no form of 
sexuality through which women can exercise agency or achieve 
empowerment. Sex, especially though not limited to heterosexual 
intercourse (Dworkin 1997), is a creation by men, for men. Not only 
are violence and sexuality inextricably intertwined for radical 
feminist theorists, sex is violence against women—more 
specifically, rape—since women cannot meaningfully consent to 
sexuality among equals under a system of patriarchy in which 
women and men are inherently unequal (MacKinnon 2001). 
According to radical feminists, gender is a function of sexuality, 
such that “women” as a group are defined by their subordinated 
position in an oppressive system of compulsory heterosexuality 
(Rich 1980). Radical feminists have been criticized by “sex-
positive” feminists (even some who are known as radical feminists, 
like Gayle Rubin), feminists of color and queer theorists for relying 
on essentialist and universalizing understandings of “women” as a 
category (Butler 1990, 1993; Rubin 1984; Liddiard 2014), without 
taking into account either women’s capacity for sexual agency and 
pleasure (Rubin 1984) or how women’s experiences of sexuality are 
informed by their positions along other axes of inequality, including 
race (Collins 2004; Crenshaw 1991; Moore 2011; García 2009), 
disability (Liddiard 2014; Kim 2011), sexuality (Rubin 1984; Stein 
1997; Faderman 1991), nationality (Espiritú 2001; Hoang 2011; 
Gonzalez-Lopez 2003), and class (Hamilton and Armstrong 2009). 
Rubin (1984) rejects radical feminist theories of sexuality on the 
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basis of their ideological closeness with more nominally 
conservative theories of sexuality which seek only to repress 
women’s sexuality. While Rubin acknowledges that western 
sexuality is characterized by a “hierarchical system of sexual value” 
(1984), wherein certain acts, identities, and desires are repressed and 
punished, she argues that sexuality per se is not the problem. Rather, 
sexual oppression must be eliminated in order for a liberated 
sexuality to flourish. Based on her criticisms of radical feminist 
theorists, Rubin concludes that feminism is an inadequate analytical 
foundation for developing a “radical theory of sex” (1984). 
Foucault (1990) problematizes Rubin’s (1984) analytical 
distinction between sexuality and oppression, arguing that sexuality 
itself is a form of power, which works by making certain expressions 
of sexuality intelligible (e.g., identities based on gendered object 
choice) and thus foreclosing other, unintelligible possibilities for 
somatic pleasure. Rather than understanding power as a repressive 
force, Foucault (1990) develops the concept of productive power—
that is, power creates possibilities rather than constraining them from 
some preexisting, infinite variety of possibilities. Further, power has 
no inherent form apart from its mechanisms; it is constantly being 
deployed through discourses and actions of individuals and its form 
is a function of the economy of these discourses. Because sexuality 
itself is constituted by and through power mechanisms, Foucault’s 
theory of sexuality precludes the elimination of sexual oppression or 
circumscription absent an elimination of sexuality per se. 
Heavily informed by Foucault’s poststructural philosophy, 
Butler (1990) expands upon Foucault’s arguments about 
intelligibility to theorize that culture and language constitute a 
“matrix of intelligibility” wherein “power relations can be 
understood…as constraining and constituting the very possibilities 
of volition.” Echoing Foucault’s (1990) theory of power as 
productive, Butler (1990) argues that the acting subject who would 
resist sexual oppression is in fact created and enabled by the very 
matrix of intelligibility which both produces and forecloses 
subjective and sexual possibilities. Butler (1993) indicts language 
and grammar themselves in the difficulty of thinking about how 
subjects are created, because the grammar of many western 
languages presupposes an agent or subject in every action. It is 
precisely this understanding of agency as voluntaristic, as a self-
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conscious act performed against power by a reflective “I,” that 
Butler deconstructs. In its place, Butler proposes the idea that “a 
performative is that discursive practice that enacts or produces that 
which it names,” and thus moves beyond the simplistic vision of 
agency as voluntarism (1993). Butler recognizes that performatives 
become sedimented and impose constraints on choice - for instance, 
constraints on sexuality include “the radical unthinkability of 
desiring otherwise, the radical unendurability of desiring otherwise,” 
but the unimaginability of alternatives does not mean sexuality is an 
immutable ontological reality (1993). Rather, these constraints 
produce the possibility of performative sexuality. Thus, whereas 
(radical) feminist theorists understand power as a repressive force 
that acts to constrain sexual expression, queer theorists argue that 
power is performative and productive, constantly being reiterated 
through actions that produce the very conditions under which 
expressions of sexuality are possible and imaginable.  
Queer theorists argue that the “matrix of intelligibility” (Butler 
1990) works in part through normativity, whereby all expressions of 
sexuality are constructed, valued, and understood in relation to what 
is considered “normal” in a given societal context (Butler 1990; 
Butler 1993; Sedgwick 1993a, 1993b; Namaste 1994). The concept 
of normativity goes beyond the notions of deviance found in gay and 
lesbian studies to problematize and denaturalize the “normal” 
instead of simply normalizing the “deviant” (Namaste 1994; 
Seidman 1996). While Sedgwick (1993a) argues the binary 
underpinning all others is the homosexual/heterosexual binary, 
Collins (2004) discusses a “master binary” of normal/deviant. On 
this point, Collins is more convincing: queer theory’s focus on 
sexuality at the expense of other axes of inequality (Warner 1993) 
has limited its incorporation of race as a constitutive element of 
sexuality and vice versa. By positing normal/deviant as the master 
binary which underlies all others, Collins (2004) effectively 
“intersectionalizes” queer theory’s emphasis on normativity. 
Developments in queer theory and intersectionality (Crenshaw 
1991) linking race, gender, and sexuality have enabled scholars to 
conduct rich analyses of the ways constructions of race, gender, and 
sexuality are intertwined through discourses of normativity and “the 
normal” (Ward 2008). hooks (1992), Somerville (2000), and Collins 
(2004) argue that the tropes found in contemporary discourses of 
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black female sexuality - the black “booty,” the jezebel, the un-rape-
able black woman, among others—originate in the discourses of 
black female sexuality under slavery in the United States. These 
sexualized “controlling images” of black women are always 
constructed in relation to the normal white woman (Collins 1990; 
Collins 2004). Moreover, Somerville (2000) shows that the “crisis 
of homo/heterosexual definition,” which emerged in the United 
States in the late nineteenth century, was and is inextricably linked 
to conflicts over racial definition, particularly over the boundary 
between “black” and “white.” hooks (1992) discusses more recent 
forms of white fascination with black women’s bodies, arguing that 
“although contemporary thinking about black female bodies does 
not attempt to read the body as a sign of ‘natural’ racial inferiority, 
the fascination with black ‘butts’ continues.” In the age of the “new 
racism,” discourses of black racial inferiority now tend to rest upon 
arguments of cultural, rather than biological, pathology (Collins 
2004). Collins presents a spectacularly tight intersectional analysis 
of how white medical professionals and lay people construct 
pathological black sexuality as a lynchpin of black racial difference 
(2004). Collins’s (2004) explication of the new racism coupled with 
hooks’s (1992) analysis of the black “booty” show how nineteenth-
century medical discourses of black female sexuality (Somerville 
2000) have been transformed and redeployed in new ways to 
reinforce inequalities at the intersections of race and gender through 
the present day. hooks’s (1992) and Collins’s (2004) analyses of the 
lived experiences of today’s black women prove that the discourses 
of the “new racism” (Collins 20024) have emerged out of those of 
the nineteenth century; for this reason, Somerville’s (2000) work has 
important implications for the ways scholars and activists combat 
normative race, gender, and sexuality today. 
For instance, the cultural belief that black women cannot 
“really” be raped originates in the slavery-era controlling image of 
the black female slave as sexually voracious (Collins 2004); this 
image contributes to a social climate in which black women are more 
likely than white women to be raped by men (Crenshaw 1991), less 
likely to report it to a hostile police bureaucracy (Collins 1990, 
Collins 2004), and unlikely to see their rapists brought to justice in 
the criminal justice system (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 1990; Collins 
2004). Furthermore, in a society characterized by white supremacy 
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and racial injustice, black women (e.g. Anita Hill) are often 
encouraged to be silent about sexual abuses committed by black 
men; because black women live at the nexus of racial and sexual 
oppression, they must weigh public racial solidarity against personal 
experiences of sexual victimization (Collins 1990; Collins 2004; 
Crenshaw 1991). It is precisely these confluences of inequalities 
based on race, gender, and sexuality (among others) which create 
such impossible subject positions within the matrix of normativity 
and intelligibility (Butler 1990). 
Nagel (2000) calls this system of normative race, gender, and 
sexuality the “ethnosexual regime.” According to Nagel, one major 
way ethnicity and sexuality are related is through normative 
heterosexuality, based on appropriate roles for (masculine) men and 
(feminine) women. She shows how the regulatory power of 
normativity rests on the convergence of intersecting discourses 
about race, gender, and sexuality. Nagel reports that while “queer 
theorists have shown themselves to be quite adept at deconstructing 
gender binaries, heterosexuality, and opposite-sex desire[, they] are 
less successful when it comes to providing systematic accounting of 
the ways these core social categories and regimes emerge as stable 
structures.” When it comes to race, humanities scholars and 
philosophers such as hooks (1992) and Somerville (2000) provide 
compelling arguments for the ways race and sexuality are co-
constructed through their relationships to normative ideals. 
Sociologists and intersectional theorists (Collins 2004; Crenshaw 
1991) excel at showing how these systems of sexual and racial 
normativity result in inequalities “on the ground” - that is, how 
discourses reflect and shape the lived experiences of actual people 
living today. 
Indeed, the incorporation of race into theory and research on 
sexualities has certainly been slow-moving and often analytically 
clunky. Some otherwise brilliant pieces pay only lip service to 
considerations of race or altogether ignore it. To their credit, both 
Faderman (1991) and Butler (1993) acknowledge the importance of 
race in constructions of sexuality and sexual politics. Faderman 
(1991) discusses the transformations in lesbian life during the 20th 
century, citing the popularity of butch-femme relationships in two 
historical periods: the 1950s and the 1980s. While Faderman does 
recognize that lesbians’ different experiences of race affect their 
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sexual subjectivities, she theorizes the working-class butch-femme 
relationships of color during the 1950s as convenient imitations of 
heterosexuality, as “paths of least resistance” when throwing off 
gender norms would have been too difficult. Later in the book, she 
argues that the resurgence of butch-femme identities and 
relationships in the 1980s, following the popular (white) lesbian 
androgyny of the 1970s, was a “conscious attempt to create sexual 
polarities in order to enhance erotic relationships between women 
and break away from the limiting orthodoxies of lesbian-feminism 
and middle-class lesbianism” (Faderman 1991). In this way, 
Faderman implicitly constructs a classed and raced hierarchy in 
which working-class butches and femmes of color are cultural dupes 
who uncritically imitate heterosexuals, while white middle-class 
butches and femmes are self-conscious creators of empowering, 
specifically lesbian erotic identities. By failing to explore how 
working-class butches and femmes of color might construct and 
experience their own identities as subversive to normative white 
heterosexuality, Faderman relies on stereotypes of working-class 
people of color as less intelligent and agentic than white, middle-
class people (1991). 
Butler (1993) offers Bodies that Matter as an update of and 
expansion to her arguments in Gender Trouble (1990). While Butler 
(1993) promises to incorporate race more heavily into the later book, 
race as a consideration is intermittently included and under-
developed. Butler argues that the heterosexual imperative is not only 
based on a taboo against homosexuality, but is also constituted 
“through a complex set of racial injunctions which operate through 
the taboo on miscegenation,” a theme which Somerville (2000, 
above) takes up in much greater detail. What is particularly 
problematic in Butler (1993) is Butler’s lack of engagement with 
theorists of intersectionality, even during an extended discussion of 
identity politics in which she implores scholars and activists “to map 
out the interrelationships that connect, without simplistically 
uniting, a varietal of dynamic and relational positionalities within 
the political field.” Butler does not cite Crenshaw’s work and thus 
gives the impression that mapping the interrelationships between 
various positionalities is a new idea. Furthermore, in an otherwise 
nuanced discussion of possibilities for subverting systems of 
inequality, Butler (1993) uncritically and summarily dismisses the 
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reclamation of the term “nigga/er” as potentially radical and/or 
liberatory, moving immediately onto another reclaimed epithet—
"queer”—as the more radical and subversive term. This is a shocking 
and inexcusable lack of engagement with a potentially rich analysis 
of how and why racially and sexually marginalized groups reclaim 
and redeploy such words for the purposes of empowerment, 
liberation, and resistance. Although Nagel (2000) attempts to bridge 
terminological and bibliographical boundaries between disciplines 
concerned with race, gender, and sexuality, it seems that many 
scholars, including Butler (1993), remain firmly entrenched in their 
respective disciplinary camps. 
All of the aforementioned theoretical perspectives have 
commonalities with one another, despite their sometimes-divergent 
understandings of sexuality, power, and race. First, each of them 
links sexuality with power, a significant development in a field 
which has often conceived of both race and sexuality as properties 
of individuals. Second, each of them recognizes that forms of 
inequality are borne through sexuality. Third, each of these 
perspectives understands that failure to comply with hegemonic or 
normative ideals of racialized heterosexuality may result in 
punishments or consequences, whether through violence (Dworkin 
1997; MacKinnon 2001; Jeffreys 1996; Crenshaw 1991; Somerville 
2000; Collins 2004), the legal system (Sedgwick 1993b; Rubin 
1984), pain at the level of individual consciousness (hooks 1992; 
Collins 1990; Collins 2004) or the circumscription of alternative 
ways of understanding the self (Foucault 1990; Butler 1990; Butler 
1993). Finally, all of the above theorists either hint at or explicitly 
envision the possibility of a future without oppression or regulation 
of the self. Where sexualities scholars differ is in what their 
respective visions of a liberated sexuality entail and how they 
suggest we should get there.  
What Does Liberation Look Like? 
While many sexualities scholars decry sexual oppression and 
repression, few explicitly define what a sexuality freed from power 
relations would look like. Rubin (1975) envisions “an androgynous 
and genderless (though not sexless) society, in which one’s sexual 
anatomy is irrelevant to who one is, what one does, and with whom 
one makes love.” Rubin’s theoretical foundation in structural 
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anthropology leads her not to question the ontology of sex and 
sexuality as presocial; a poststructural critique of her vision would 
ask whether “making love” would even exist in a society without 
gender, as sexuality is constituted through discourse, predicated 
upon understandings of men’s and women’s sexuality in relational 
terms, and conceptualized based on gendered object choice (Butler 
1990; Foucault 1990).  
Perhaps the difficulty in imagining a liberatory sexuality arises 
from sexuality’s inextricability from power relations (Foucault 
1990). For Foucault, the question of a liberated sexuality is a non-
starter, as sexuality itself is power. Because this sexuality was 
created by and is constituted through power relations, there is no 
liberatory form of sexuality or sexual identity; the only possible 
route to liberation is the destruction of sexuality itself and the rise of 
a somatic economy of “bodies and pleasures” (1990). Foucault’s 
vision is not without criticisms: Foucault’s intellectual heir Judith 
Butler (1990) critiques Foucault’s vision of bodies and pleasures on 
the grounds that it is an “unacknowledged emancipatory ideal” that 
is not so different from psychoanalytic theories of presocial, infantile 
polymorphous perversity (Freud 1905). Because of Butler’s 
insistence that subjects and ideas are only intelligible and thinkable 
through language, she opposes any efforts to reclaim a mythical 
prediscursive, presocial sexuality. She speaks back to Rubin (1975) 
and Foucault (1990) when she claims, “The culturally constructed 
body will then be liberated, neither to its ‘natural’ past, nor to its 
original pleasures, but to an open future of cultural possibilities” 
(1990). Butler’s vision of liberation is a queer cultural expansion of 
Foucault’s asocial somatic utopia; because Butler recognizes that 
somatic pleasures are mediated by, and indeed only understood as 
pleasurable because of, cultural schemas of intelligibility (1993), she 
argues the future of bodily experiences cannot be predicted using 
today’s conceptual tools and language.  
Patricia Hill Collins’s (2004) vision of a liberated sexuality is 
explicitly based in antiracism, an element that is conspicuously 
missing from other theorists’ visions for the future of sexuality. 
Collins (2004) argues that contemporary black sexual politics are 
borne of, and tend to reproduce, racial inequality; according to 
Collins, black social problems of misogyny and 
homophobia/heterosexism arise from a system of racist mass 
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incarceration that leads black men to need to prove their manhood 
(Collins 2004). In addition to calling for the elimination of racist 
police and criminal justice practices which facilitate this crisis of 
black masculinity, Collins lays out some elements of a liberated 
black sexuality: black women’s consciousness would be free of the 
sexualized and racist controlling images that many black women 
internalize, black individuals would have autonomy and agency over 
their bodies and relationships, and “an ethic of honesty and personal 
accountability [would characterize] all relationships that involve 
sexual contact” (2004). Collins’s conceptualization of a liberated 
sexuality as beneficial for the individual can be linked to D’Emilio’s 
(1992b) compelling—if brief—one-liner regarding liberatory 
possibilities for “sexual expression as a form of play, positive and 
life-enhancing” (1992b). While Collins situates her vision in the 
black feminist emphasis on the empowerment of personal 
consciousness (Collins 1990), D’Emilio’s (1992b) definition of 
sexual liberation is more consistent with a (white) queer politics of 
play and parody as tools for liberation (Butler 1990). 
How Do We Get There? Strategies for Subversion 
Due to theorists’ diverging interpretations of the causes and 
forms of sexual oppression as well as their differing visions of 
liberated sexuality, it is unsurprising that debates rage within the 
field of sexualities regarding the most promising strategies for 
subverting the ethnosexual regime (Nagel 2000). These strategies 
can be categorized into: 1) radical lesbian-feminist separatism, 2) 
identity politics, 3) the redeployment of gender, which encompasses 
trans and intersex bodies, gender play (e.g., butch-femme, drag, and 
shifting constructions of masculinity), and non-binary identities, 4) 
micro-level individual and interpersonal solutions, 5) changes in 
educational institutions, and 6) sexualities research itself. 
Radical Lesbian-Feminist Separatism 
Because radical feminists believe gender is a function of 
heterosexuality, such that women as a group are constituted by their 
position within a system of heteropatriarchal oppression, they argue 
that ridding society of the “straightjacket of gender” (Rubin 1975) 
will prevent heterosexuality and, consequently, patriarchy from 
maintaining themselves (McKinnon 2001, Jeffreys 1996). Under 
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patriarchy, no form of sexuality between men and women can be 
truly consensual (Rich 1980); thus, according to radical feminist 
theorists, virtually all sex is rape (Dworkin 1997, MacKinnon 2001). 
Importantly, there is no room for women’s sexual pleasure or agency 
in radical feminist theories of sexuality (Rubin 1984); even when 
women claim to enjoy intercourse with men, Dworkin (1997) indicts 
women for participating in the terms of their own oppression. 
Because radical feminist theories of sexuality leave no room for 
women’s empowerment, the only strategy for sexual liberation that 
logically follows from a radical feminist foundation is lesbian-
feminist separatism, wherein women completely extricate 
themselves from relationships with men (Rich 1980, Dworkin 
1997). As history has borne out, lesbian-feminist separatism is an 
untenable solution to sexual oppression, as it ignores the concerns of 
women of color who do not want to abandon men of color with 
whom they share experiences of racial oppression (Collins 1990), 
makes little provision for the male children of lesbian-separatists, 
and ultimately has little, if any, effect on society’s structures of 
inequality. 
To Identify or Not to Identify 
Identity politics, or the political struggle for civil rights on the 
basis of membership in a minority category, has long been a source 
of contention within social movements, including the antiracist 
movement (Crenshaw 1991), the feminist movement (Vance 1989), 
and the queer movement (D’Emilio 1992a). Scholars links these 
tensions to theories of social construction (Crenshaw 1991; Vance 
1989; Butler 1990), which tend to “simultaneously [hold] two 
somewhat contradictory goals. One goal is to attack the gender [or 
race, or sexual] system and its primacy in organizing social life, but 
the second goal is to defend women [or people of color, or queers] 
as a group” (Vance 1989). To be clear, racism, sexism, and 
heterosexism are not parallel axes of oppression and do not operate 
in all the same ways (Warner 1993); however, Vance (and I) make 
a cautious analogy here between them because of the role debates 
about identity politics have made in each of these movements for 
liberation.  
Disabilities scholar Barbara Waxman Fiduccia (2000) contends 
that people with disabilities must identify themselves as a sexual 
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minority and fight for legal sexual rights on the basis of that identity. 
However, other scholars of disability argue that analyses such as 
Fiduccia’s elide differences between forced desexualization and 
asexual identity (Kim 2011) and ignore the intersections of disability 
and gender, because of which advocating for the sexual rights of 
disabled people may further oppress women with disabilities 
(Liddiard 2014). Indeed, nearly all theorists in the field of sexualities 
either argue against identity politics as a political tool (Klesse 2014; 
Ghaziani 2011) or seek to theorize ways to employ identity politics 
strategically without falling prey to its most likely dangers (Altman 
2001; Bernstein 1997; Crenshaw 1991; Crimp 1993; Butler 1990; 
Butler 1993; Seidman 1996; Sedgwick 1993a; Stout 2014; Warner 
1993; Weeks 1998). 
Quite straightforward critiques of identity politics come from 
queer scholars Klesse (2014) and Ghaziani (2011). Klesse (2014) 
interviews polyamorous people to uncover the meanings these 
individuals give to the term “polyamorous.” He discovers that while 
some people view polyamory simply as a convenient label for their 
current relationship status, others view it as a core identity or sexual 
orientation, which renders “polyamory intelligible within dominant 
political and legal frameworks of sexual diversity” (2014). Klesse 
identifies four “severe risks” of advocating for the legal rights of 
polyamorous people using an identity politics framework based on 
sexual orientation. Doing so would 1) undermine the disruptive 
political potential of the category polyamory, 2) achieve only 
selective protection under the law, 3) obstruct the ability of poly 
movements to pursue broader alliances, and 4) foster a politics of 
recognition at the expense of a more transformative political agenda 
(2014). While Klesse’s arguments against a polyamorous identity 
politics are compelling, it is frustrating that he offers no alternative 
political strategies.  
Ironically, one of the risks Klesse identifies about polyamorous 
identity politics - its tendency to obstruct the ability of movements 
to form coalitions—at first appears to run counter to Ghaziani’s 
(2011) analysis of gay identity politics. Ghaziani argues that whereas 
older models of gay identity politics were based on an “us-versus-
them” mentality, in the “post-gay” era, this form has changed to 
reflect an “us-and-them” model of identity politics (2011). The shift 
from “versus” to “and” reflects the documented desire of gay 
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activists to build coalitions with the dominant group, as opposed to 
constructing gay culture against the dominant culture (Coleman-
Fountain 2014). However, this seeming contradiction between 
Klesse (2014) and Ghaziani (2011) is rectified if one allows that 
Klesse (2014) most likely meant that polyamorous people should 
build coalitions with other stigmatized groups against the dominant 
culture, rather than build coalitions with it. Indeed, Ghaziani (2011) 
views contemporary gay identity as less politicized and more 
privatized, and based in the desire for inclusion into mainstream 
culture, which is one of the primary risks of identity politics named 
by Klesse (2014).  
To be sure, a common theme in arguments against identity 
politics is its tendency to assimilate oppressed groups into, rather 
than challenge, systems of inequality (Bernstein 1997; Butler 1990, 
1993; Seidman 1996; Warner 1993; Weeks 1998). At a more basic 
level, queer theorists’ treatments of identity politics tend to 
emphasize the instability and incoherence of identities as such. 
According to a queer perspective, then, it logically follows that a 
politics based on such an unstable foundation would have limited 
value (Butler 1990, 1993; Seidman 1996). Based on her view that 
there is no prediscursive subject, Butler (1990) argues that feminist 
identity politics preclude the feminist goal of women’s emancipation 
because the feminist subject—the “woman”—is created by the very 
discursive and legal system from which it seeks emancipation. Later, 
Butler (1993) amends her original discussion of the category 
“women” to argue that identities (what she calls “subject-positions”) 
can be politically useful in contestations for legal rights, but are full 
of risk and incoherence. Butler novelly proposes that the very 
weakness of the category of women—its inability to be 
descriptive—“is the very condition of its political efficacy. In this 
sense, what is lamented as disunity and factionalization…[is 
actually] the open and democratizing potential of the category.” In 
this way, Butler acknowledges the incoherence of the category but 
suggests that the strategic deployment of the category is what will 
enable both the securing of rights within the legal system that exists 
today as well as the category’s ultimate contestation as new political 
opportunities arise. Indeed, to refuse completely to deploy identity 
would be to refuse power, which Butler argues is impossible; thus, 
in Butler’s view, “the normative focus for gay and lesbian practice 
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ought to be on the…redeployment of power rather than on the 
impossible fantasy of its full-scale transcendence.”  
Most scholars of identity politics seem resistant to throwing the 
baby out with the bathwater, and instead argue for a thoughtful and 
strategic—as opposed to universalizing and uncritical—deployment 
of identity as a political tool (Altman 2001; Bernstein 1997; Butler 
1990, 1993; Crenshaw 1991; Crimp 1993; Seidman 1996; Stout 
2014; Warner 1993). Some scholars who study race and nationality 
argue that the queer project of complete categorical deconstruction 
is a privileged way of viewing identity, possibly based in a “desire 
for sameness” that may reflect the concerns of white, able-bodied 
queer people who would otherwise be able to claim the privilege of 
being normal (Coleman-Fountain 2014). Both Altman (2001) and 
Stout (2014) are sympathetic to queer critiques of American identity 
politics, but they warn against the tendency to project queer 
deconstructive political projects onto political struggles in non-US 
nations and cultures. Because these struggles reflect the particular 
configurations of identity and inequality of the cultures in which 
they are located, Stout (2014) implores scholars in the Global North 
to “recognize and respect different strategies for gay 
advocacy…even when such approaches run counter to our own 
philosophies.”  
It is likely that divergent perspectives on the validity of 
categorical deconstruction and identity politics arise from 
differences in the forms various types of identities take; for instance, 
racial identity is a “supra-individual” identity (Brubaker 2015) 
usually formed early in life as a reflection of the racial identity of 
one’s family members, whereas queer identity is usually formed 
later and may or may not reflect the identities of one’s family or 
community. Among other differences, these variations in identity 
development likely have ramifications for how scholars and lay 
people conceptualize the value of retaining or rejecting those 
identities. When it comes to axes of inequality in the United States, 
from which many queer theorists hail, Crenshaw (1991) asserts that 
“the dimension of racial domination that has been most vexing to 
African Americans has not been the social categorization as such but 
the myriad ways in which those of us so defined have been 
systematically subordinated.” This perspective that is at odds with a 
(white) queer understanding of categorization itself as the problem. 
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Certainly, many people of color do not desire to abandon racial 
identities which provide them with feelings of family, community, 
resilience, and empowerment (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 1990, 2004). 
Crenshaw famously offers intersectionality as a “mediator between 
assertions of multiple identity and the necessity of group politics for 
social change” (1991). By understanding identity as an unstable and 
always-shifting reflection of one’s subject positions along multiple 
axes of privilege and disadvantage, activists and scholars may 
deploy identity as a political tool when necessary without 
uncritically assuming the coherence or homogeneity of any identity 
category.  
Bernstein (1997) and Crimp (1993) theorize the strategic 
deployment of identity politics to determine how to avoid its 
potential pitfalls (the reification of constructed categories, its 
inattention to the intersections of multiple identities, and its tendency 
to advocate for assimilation into, rather than the deconstruction of, 
normative mainstream cultures) while taking advantage of its 
efficacies as a political tool in the struggle for legal rights under the 
state as it currently exists. Bernstein (1997) theorizes identity 
deployment as dramaturgical (Goffman 1959); as such, strategically 
deployed identities do not have to, and indeed cannot, reflect actors’ 
private understandings of those identities. She identifies three types 
of identity deployment: identity for empowerment, identity as a goal 
(whether destigmatizing or deconstructing), and identity as strategy. 
There are two types of identity deployment for strategic purposes: 
first, identity for critique, which confronts the values, categories, and 
practices of the dominant culture, and second, identity for education, 
which challenges the dominant culture’s perception of the minority 
to gain legitimacy. Bernstein argues that “identity for education” 
tends to be a conservative strategy which avoids challenging or 
controversializing the dominant culture. Crimp’s (1993) 
understanding of identities as relational complements Bernstein’s 
(1997) arguments about the dramaturgical deployment of identity. 
According to Crimp, “identification is, of course, identification with 
an other, which means that identity is never identical to itself” 
(1993). Furthermore, Crimp rejects the truism that “gay people were 
gay and they made a politics of it”; rather, Crimp argues, the real 
story is that the politics made the people gay. That is, identity politics 
enabled the flourishing of a gay—as opposed to homosexual or 
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homophile—culture. By focusing on the relational aspects of 
identity, Crimp argues, queer activists will be more able to form 
coalitions with one another and with other groups in the struggle 
against normativity. Thus, Bernstein (1997) and Crimp (1993) 
provide scholars and activists with a template for how to understand 
the risks and potentialities of different deployments of identity 
politics; by avoiding those deployments most likely to reify the 
dominant culture as normal and unproblematic, activists can engage 
in thoughtful identity politics with the goal of subverting systems of 
power and oppression.  
Ultimately, most queer scholars do not summarily reject identity 
politics; rather, they acknowledge the political efficacy of identity 
politics as a necessary evil within the current political system in 
which we all live. What is ironic in these queer discussions of 
identity politics, however, is the lack of attention to “queer” as an 
identity. While a queer politics is indeed based upon the 
deconstruction of sexual categories, queerness has taken on its own 
culture and criteria for membership, much like other identity 
categories. Warner (1993) criticizes queer politics for its whiteness, 
maleness, and emphasis on middle-class values, consumption and 
experiences. This leads me to cautiously posit that queer politics is 
itself a de facto identity politics. Further theorizing is needed into 
how thoroughly queer (apart from gay and lesbian) activism and 
politics has itself incorporated normative understandings of identity, 
group membership, and political struggle. 
The Redeployment of Power: Abject Bodies, Gender Play, & 
Non-Binary Identities 
Butler (1990) argues that “power can be neither withdrawn nor 
refused, but only redeployed.” In keeping with her theory of power 
as omnipresent, constituted through discourse and every 
performative act, Butler (1990) is hopeful that “abject bodies” 
(1990), butch-femme relationships, and drag performances might 
also be used in the service of subverting normative gender and 
sexuality. Because normative bodies are defined in opposition to 
abject bodies, implied by Butler (1990) to be trans and/or intersex, 
abject bodies haunt and threaten to destabilize the regime of 
normative embodiment. For Butler, such bodies are “an enabling 
disruption, the occasion for a radical rearticulation of the symbolic 
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horizon in which bodies come to matter at all.” It seems that Butler 
is arguing that the very acknowledgement of the existence of such 
bodies would do much toward dismantling normative gender. 
Fausto-Sterling (2000) similarly posits that “if we choose, over a 
period of time, to let mixed-gender bodies and altered patterns of 
gender-related behavior become visible, we will have, willy-nilly, 
chosen to change the rules of cultural intelligibility.”  
However, Kessler’s (1990) analysis of doctors’ treatment of 
intersex infants and Roen’s (2002) discussion of transgender 
“passing” shed some doubt that the mere existence or visibility of 
abject bodies will disrupt the gender regime. Kessler (1990) reports 
that physicians and parents erroneously cling to the belief that 
“gender consists of two exclusive types” and that this belief “is 
maintained and perpetuated by the medical community in the face 
of incontrovertible physical evidence that this is not mandated by 
biology.” Roen (2002) argues that because of the risk of violence 
transgender individuals face, “passing” as cisgender is often 
required for survival. Against a queer political hierarchy where 
transgenderism (as opposed to transsexualism) is seen as trendier 
and more radical, Roen argues for a more generous understanding of 
passing among trans people. Kessler (1990) and Roen (2002) 
indicate that within a highly regulatory system of gender, those 
whose bodies and/or genders are unintelligible or non-normative 
often have gender imputed onto them or risk violence for publicly 
flouting the binary gender system. Thus, Butler’s (1990, 1993) and 
Fausto-Sterling’s (2000) optimism about the disruptive potential of 
abject bodies may be overstated, and in addition, may place too 
heavy a burden on intersex and trans people to be the standard 
bearers of dismantling the gender regime. 
In addition to the transformative power of trans and intersex 
bodies, Butler argues that the non-normative gendering of cisgender 
bodies - such as in butch-femme lesbian relationships - also has the 
power to denaturalize cultural understandings of sex and gender and 
expose “the utterly constructed status of the so-called heterosexual 
original” (Butler 1990). In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler is mostly 
uncritical of drag and butch-femme, offering gender parody as the 
most promising avenue for the future of queer politics.  
Given radical feminists’ rejection of the liberatory potential 
inherent in trans subjectivities, it is unsurprising that radical feminist 
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Sheila Jeffreys (1996) criticizes Butler’s (1990, 1993) hopefulness 
about butch-femme identities. Jeffreys links butch-femme sexuality 
to the reinforcement of men’s masculine domination, domestic 
violence, and rape. Furthermore, she indicts postmodern feminist 
and queer theorists for promoting the reclamation and redeployment 
of formerly oppressive genders, identities, and practices, arguing 
that “this is a comforting ploy which allows persons who wish to see 
themselves as progressive to continue to gain excitement from 
practices of dominance and submission without experiencing any 
political discomfort” (Jeffreys 1996). This quote is a stinging insult 
directed at her theoretical opponents, but it reveals itself as more like 
the expression of a personal vendetta than a substantive criticism of 
the politics of parody and redeployment. Indeed, Jeffreys’s (1996) 
analysis is unconvincing on an analytical level, as it fails to 
recognize and neutralize its own essentialism and conservatism. 
Nagel (2000) briefly casts some doubt on Butler’s arguments 
about the subversive potential of drag when she notes “the 
entrenched power of phallic-centered heteronormativity to stay on 
top (so to speak) and reproduce itself…it is a resilient system 
capable of absorbing and appropriating challenges on its edges in 
order to strengthen itself.” In response to Nagel’s critique and others, 
Butler (1993) qualifies her arguments about gender parody: drag is 
ambivalent, a useful technique for subversion but not subversive in 
and of itself. Applied uncritically, drag performances can replicate 
misogyny, racism, and homophobia. Additionally, Butler 
acknowledges that even though drag and butch-femme render the 
constructed status of heterosexuality and gender visible, “there is no 
guarantee that exposing the naturalized status of heterosexuality will 
lead to its subversion” (1993). Thus, Butler recognizes that even the 
denaturalization of heterosexuality can work to bolster 
heterosexuality, and uses examples from popular movies like Mrs. 
Doubtfire to prove this point. However, one angle that Butler (1993) 
does not consider is that viewers of drag performances may not see 
denaturalization; where Butler sees subversion, parody, and 
denaturalization, viewers invested in normative conceptions of 
gender and sexuality may see failed imitation. Richardson (1996) 
argues that the dominant heterosexual society will not interpret 
gender parody as denaturalization but as failed heterosexuality. 
While Richardson links her arguments to Jeffreys’s (1996) 
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problematic discussions of drag and butch-femme gender 
transgression as oppressive and uncritical imitations of 
heterosexuality, I do criticize Butler on this point. I find Butler’s 
(1990, 1993) arguments for the liberatory potential of drag 
compelling, in that any effort to decouple gender from bodies can 
serve to denaturalize the binary sex/gender system. However, it 
seems that Butler has not considered the vital importance of how 
drag performances are received and interpreted. The viewer may 
impute meanings onto drag or butch-femme relationships which 
renaturalize and serve to shore up normative gender and sexuality. 
Thus, a more extended discussion is needed on precisely how to 
ensure that drag and butch-femme, which she characterizes as 
ambivalent, subvert rather than reinforces the normal. 
Gender play is not always linked to explicit butch-femme 
identities or drag performances; Pascoe (2007) and Bridges (2014) 
document the ways the meanings of masculinity are shifting. In her 
ethnography of adolescent masculinity in high school, Pascoe (2007) 
argues that while male femininity is regarded as alternatively 
humorous and dangerous, female masculinity is revered; often this 
female masculinity is linked to a lesbian identity, but not always. 
Masculinity among high school girls often includes elements of 
discursively refashioning female bodies as male ones—girls referred 
to their chests as “muscles” instead of breasts, to their genitals as 
“jocks” instead of vaginas,” and hurled gendered insults such as 
“They can suck my cock!” These discursive practices both 
denaturalize the link between sexed bodies and gender performances 
and renaturalize the relationship between masculinity and male 
bodies (Pascoe 2007). Bridges (2014) argues that “hybrid 
masculinities”—"gender projects that incorporate ‘bits and pieces’ 
(Demetriou 2001) of marginalized and subordinated masculinities 
and, at times, femininities” similarly have the potential to either 
challenge or reinforce inequalities. By theorizing the concept of 
“sexual aesthetics” as “cultural and stylistic distinctions used to 
delineate boundaries between gay and straight cultures and 
individuals,” Bridges illustrates how heterosexual men who identify 
aspects of themselves as “gay” retain heterosexual privileges by 
reinforcing the “otherness” of gay men (2014). Pascoe (2007) and 
Bridges (2014) utilize empirical data to test Butler’s (1990, 1993) 
claims about the radical possibilities of gender parody and play. 
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Both authors conclude that in the absence of a politicized 
understanding of how gender and sexuality are linked to systems of 
inequality, seemingly progressive practices of gender play do not 
necessarily disrupt normative systems of gender and sexuality 
(Pascoe 2007, Bridges 2014). 
Because normative sexuality rests so thoroughly on 
understandings of sexuality as either homo- or heterosexual identity, 
expressions of sexuality that disrupt this binary have the potential to 
dismantle normative schemas of gender and sexuality (Namaste 
1994, Klesse 2014). Klesse (2014) and Scherrer (2008) document 
the identity work of polyamorous and asexual individuals, 
respectively. Klesse contends that polyamory, which is experienced 
by some individuals as a sexual orientation, has the potential to 
disrupt normative sexuality. Scherrer (2008) argues that because 
sexuality is considered a normal and important part of selfhood, 
“individuals who do not experience sexual attraction, and who 
embrace an asexual identity, are in a unique position to inform the 
social construction of sexuality.” What is particularly interesting 
about polyamorous and asexual sexual orientations is that they are 
not based (only) on gendered object choice, which has been the 
dominant way of understanding sexual orientation since the 
nineteenth century (Foucault 1990). However, as Klesse (2014) 
warns, the adoption of any sexual preference as a “sexual 
orientation” has the power to reify essentialist understandings of 
sexuality as a pre-social condition, which may render the 
dismantling of normative sexuality more difficult (Sedgwick 
1993b). In order to move the disruptive potential of non-binary 
sexual identities beyond the individual to a more structural level, 
D’Emilio (1992b) advocates for the creation of programs that enable 
people to live outside the nuclear family, a normative structure based 
on regulatory ideals of heterosexual monogamy; he anticipates that 
“as we create structures beyond the nuclear family that provide a 
sense of belonging, the family will wane in significance.”  
Micro-Level Individual and Interpersonal Solutions 
While most sociologists and queer theorists focus on changes at 
the cultural and structural level, some are optimistic about the radical 
possibilities of individual and interpersonal change. These scholars 
emphasize the value of changes in personal consciousness as a first 
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step in creating broader societal change (Collins 1990, 2004; hooks 
1992; Kimmel 2009). Explaining the purpose of his recent book 
Guyland, masculinities scholar Michael Kimmel writes that he 
hopes to map the terrain of “Guyland”—which represents “both a 
stage of life, a liminal undefined time span between adolescence and 
adulthood…and a place, or rather, a bunch of places where guys 
gather to be guys together”—to enable men to navigate the social 
world in ways that do not reproduce inequalities (2009). The 
solution Kimmel proposes is to change the ways guys understand the 
meaning of being a “real man.” According to Kimmel, “being a man 
means doing the right thing, standing up to immorality and injustice 
when you see it, and expressing compassion, not contempt, for those 
who are less fortunate. In other words, it’s about being courageous.” 
While these personality traits are certainly laudable goals, a 
weakness in Kimmel’s argument is that he relies on the trope of the 
“real man.” By drawing on masculine cachet associated with agency, 
largesse, and courage, Kimmel effectively reifies the oppositional 
binary between men and women. As Namaste (1994) and Sedgwick 
(1993a) point out, the boundary between two halves of a binary is 
never neutral, but rather every binary is based on a relationship of 
unequal value, of domination and subordination. Thus, Kimmel’s 
(2009) goal of challenging gender normativity may be precluded by 
his own analysis. A more generous reading of Kimmel’s argument 
could follow from Butler’s (1990, 1993) insistence that power can 
never be refused, only redeployed; one might argue that Kimmel is 
advocating for a strategic redeployment of masculine gender. 
However, as Bridges (2014) shows, “playing” with privileged 
positions in the matrix of gender and sexual normativity often allows 
privileged people to retain the benefits associated with their gender 
and sexuality without challenging the overall gender or sexual order. 
Furthermore, because Kimmel’s definition of a “real man” is so 
thoroughly congruent with hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1995), 
dismantling the gender order by invoking the trope of manliness is 
highly unlikely.  
Black feminist theorists offer a more compelling analysis of the 
transformative potential of individual consciousness (Collins 1990, 
2004; hooks 1992). As opposed to the relatively privileged, mostly 
white men Kimmel (2009) interviews, whose identities are informed 
by few if any truly “controlling images” (Collins 1990), black 
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feminists argue that black women’s identities are often formed 
through the tension of both internalizing and rejecting racist and 
sexualized controlling images about black women (Collins 1990, 
2004; hooks 1992). Collins (1990) argues that if black women can 
help each other create empowering self-definitions, these “self-
defined standpoints can stimulate resistance” against oppression. 
According to Collins, through linking personal experiences with 
patterns of discrimination and oppression, black women will be able 
to strategize against power as autonomous agents of change.  
While some theorists warn against placing the “responsibility on 
the sufferer to relieve one’s suffering” (Grzanka and Mann 2014), in 
a social context of routine disparagement, one of the most accessible 
forms of resistance to racism and (hetero)sexism for black women 
has been their own internal consciousness (Collins 1990). Whereas 
to argue that class-privileged white men should empower their 
individual consciousnesses to help them dismantle the gender order 
seems overly optimistic, black feminist theorists (1992) present 
compelling arguments for the transformative power of rebuilding the 
self-definitions of marginalized people. hooks’s (1992) and 
Collins’s (1990, 2004) analyses of the power of black feminist 
consciousness, juxtaposed with Kimmel’s (2009) problematic 
reification of the trope of the interpersonally benevolent “real man,” 
illustrate that no micro-level subversive strategy will be appropriate 
in all contexts. Thus, scholars must attend to the ways various 
strategies may be employed by a variety of people in the service of 
subverting the ethnosexual regime. 
Changes in Educational Institutions 
Scholars identify sex education (Bhana and Anderson 2013; 
Fields 2005; García 2009; Rogers 2009) and institutional structures 
of schools and universities (Hamilton and Armstrong 2009; Pascoe 
2007) as sites with potential for dismantling the ethnosexual regime 
(Nagel 2000). Based on interviews with South African teenage 
women, Bhana and Anderson (2013) conclude that these young 
women are “sexual strategizers” who resist femininities through 
which gender inequalities in sexuality are reproduced while 
simultaneously reproducing hegemonic masculinity in sexual 
relationships by purposefully consuming drugs and alcohol prior to 
encounters with boys. The authors suggest sex education programs 
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in girls’ schools 1) conceptualize the girls as constrained sexual 
agents rather than as passive victims and 2) focus not only on sexual 
risk but also the risks of drugs and alcohol (Bhana and Anderson 
2013). García (2009) and Fields (2005) also identify a “risk” 
discourse in sex education for young Latina and African American 
girls, respectively. The researchers argue that sex education for these 
young women should avoid racist discourses of girls of color as non-
normatively heterosexual and boys and men of color as potentially 
abusive (Fields 2005; García 2009). In an autoethnography of her 
experience as the mother of an adolescent girl with a moderate 
learning disability, Rogers (2009) discusses the difficulty of 
ensuring her daughter’s sexual relationships are not abusive or 
coercive while respecting her daughter’s autonomy. Rogers (2009) 
recounts an episode in which a teacher removed her daughter from 
a sex education class without informing Rogers; she argues in favor 
of sex education for developmentally disabled adolescents, noting 
that “whilst a moral panic about surveillance and regulation of 
learning-disabled youth may not be appropriate, some support and 
education is necessary in thinking through and living through these 
sexual and intimate journeys.” What all of these scholars have in 
common is a belief that access to information about sexuality is not 
enough to ensure adolescent girls develop autonomy and agency in 
sexual relationships; in order to help these young women disrupt 
patterns of inequality in sexuality, their education must consider 
their multiple subject positions at various axes of inequality 
including gender, race, and disability (Bhana and Anderson 2013; 
Fields 2005; García 2009; Rogers 2009). 
Sex education classrooms are not the only educational sites in 
which normative gender and sexuality are reproduced and contested 
(Pascoe 2007). Rather, institutions of learning must recognize that 
the way they are structured can either contribute to or challenge 
gender, sexual, and class inequalities (Armstrong and Hamilton 
2013; Hamilton and Armstrong 2009; Pascoe 2007). Pascoe (2007) 
emphasizes the importance of legislation aimed at protecting queer 
and non-normatively gendered students from harassment—
crucially, educational administrators must be aware of these laws 
and enforce them institutionally. Furthermore, schools should 
“modify both the social organization of the school and the 
curriculum content so that they are less homophobic and gender 
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normative”; examples include deemphasizing heterosexuality and 
normative gender in school rituals, providing support for queer-
affirmative organizations like Gay-Straight Alliances, enforcing a 
gender-neutral dress code, and offering counseling for queer and 
gender non-conforming teens (Pascoe 2007). These institutional-
level changes would demonstrate to both queer and non-queer 
students alike that schools are places where homophobia and 
heterosexism are unwelcome. 
Armstrong and Hamilton (2013) argue that declining federal 
funding for colleges and universities has led schools to raise their 
tuition, thus increasing institutional pressure to recruit affluent 
students whose families can foot the bill. This means universities 
facilitate a “college culture [that] reflects the beliefs of the more 
privileged classes,” including a “self-development imperative” that 
leads more privileged women to think they should focus on 
themselves, be independent, and avoid serious relationships that 
compete with schoolwork and social life (Hamilton and Armstrong 
2009). This self-development imperative facilitates a normative 
sexual culture revolving around “hooking up”; whereas hooking up 
is common among more privileged women students, less privileged 
women view hooking up as “immature” and contrary to working-
class cultural and sexual values (Hamilton and Armstrong 2009). 
The institutional structures of universities encourage the hook-up 
culture of privileged students through the development of “easy 
majors” and support for the Greek system of fraternities and 
sororities, effectively rendering the institution hostile to less 
privileged students, who 1) need to earn meaningful degrees that will 
help them find jobs without the benefit of social capital and 2) cannot 
afford to participate in Greek life (Armstrong and Hamilton 2013). 
Both Pascoe (2007) and Hamilton and Armstrong (2013) argue that 
schools and universities can and should make changes at the 
institutional level—not simply in sex education programs—to avoid 
reproducing normative schemas of gender and sexuality. 
Sexualities Research 
Finally, sexualities research itself is a strategy for subverting the 
ethnosexual regime. Certainly, most scholars of sexualities identify 
pressing problems in the social organization of sexuality and either 
support or are involved in movements to eliminate those problems. 
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Nonetheless, research is not inherently subversive: Lorber (1996) 
and Namaste (1994) warn that much sociological research 
uncritically assumes and reifies categories of analysis such as sex, 
gender, and sexuality as ontological. Furthermore, sexualities 
research also has the capacity to reinscribe social inequalities 
(Moore 2011; Rubin 1984; Sedgwick 1993b). Feminist research 
which does not take race into account may perpetuate 
misunderstandings of women of color, leading to their continued 
marginalization in feminism and society (Moore 2011). Radical 
feminist analyses of sexuality which leave no room for women’s 
agency may ironically further the conservative goal of repressing 
women’s sexuality (Rubin 1984). Ostensibly queer-affirming 
investigations into whether (homo)sexuality is inborn or socially 
constructed may rest upon the unacknowledged wish that gay people 
not exist (Sedgwick 1993b). Thus, sexualities scholars must attend 
to the power of research to both challenge and reinscribe 
inequalities, as well as be open to criticisms of their work (Butler 
1993; Fausto-Sterling 2000). 
Setting aside the speculative potential for sexualities research to 
dismantle the ethnosexual regime, it is unclear how much of an 
effect sexualities research has actually had on the broader social 
organization of sexuality. Research that tends to have the most 
influence on policy and cultural debates is that which focuses on 
sexual risks (e.g., diseases, teen pregnancies) and frequencies (e.g., 
Armstrong et al.’s (2012) discussion of the “orgasm gap,” Kinsey’s 
reports on the rates of same-sex desires and encounters in the 1950s) 
(Pascoe 2014). Postmodern queer and feminist theory have had 
much less success in circulating beyond the academy, in no small 
part due to its inaccessible, esoteric vocabulary (Altman 2001; 
Collins 1990, 2004). Thus, it is clear that sociologists and other 
scholars of sexuality must find ways to engage in public scholarship 
if we have any hope of dismantling normative gender, race, and 
sexuality. Blogging has been suggested as one promising avenue 
(Bridges 2015), and I suggest teaching as another form of activism 
that may help subvert the ethnosexual regime. Through a 
commitment to being good teachers as well as esteemed researchers 
and theorists, sociologists of sexualities can help ensure that our 
ideas move beyond the academy into the minds of students who will 
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go on to occupy various sectors of society. This is a subversive 
strategy for which I have much hope. 
Future Directions for Subversion 
Nagel (2000) hopes to encourage scholars of various disciplines, 
from ethnic studies to queer studies to sociology, to engage in 
interdisciplinary scholarship with the goal of dismantling the 
ethnosexual regime. The strengths of both queer and sociological 
approaches to racial and sexual inequalities are complementary. 
Where queer theory lacks empirical explanatory power, sociology 
provides data. Where sociology lacks an attentiveness to the 
construction and instability of categories of analyses and inequality, 
queer theory helps scholars question these analytic assumptions. 
Intersectionality provides an exciting arena in which sociologists 
may remain dedicated to one of sociology’s central projects—
documenting persistent, durable patterns of inequality—while also 
incorporating the spirit of queer theory, which seeks to interrogate 
the very categories upon which those inequalities depend. The 
complementary strengths and weaknesses of these approaches prove 
the necessity and merit of an interdisciplinary approach to the study 
of sexualities, race, and power. 
In the future, scholars should more explicitly theorize what a 
liberated sexuality or economy of somatic pleasures would look like; 
a more defined vision would enable clearer strategies for subversion. 
Furthermore, sociologists of sexualities should attempt to theorize 
sexualities as encompassing more features than gendered object 
choice. As Sedgwick (1993a) writes: 
Although current understandings of sexuality hinge 
on gender of object choice, this is not a reason to 
understand sexuality as emanating from gender. 
The definitional narrowing-down of sexuality to a 
homo/hetero binary should not be used analytically 
to conflate sexuality with gender; this narrowing-
down itself is what should be analyzed as a 
historically specific process. Relatedly, sexual 
theory cannot be collapsed into gay and lesbian 
theory or anti-homophobic theory because sexuality 
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per se totally overflows the bounds of that portion 
of sexuality based on gendered object choice. 
  
By following Sedgwick’s (1993a) advice, scholars of sexuality can 
avoid reifying dominant cultural understandings of sexualities and 
thus move beyond them.  
Likewise, other biases within sexualities theory need to be 
examined: one of the primary unacknowledged assumptions in 
contemporary postmodern queer and feminist theory is the premise 
that gender play and gender transgression necessarily indicate a 
“mismatch” or “swap” between sexed bodies and gender 
performances, i.e., female masculinity, male femininity, butch-
femme relationships, drag performances. Almost nonexistent are 
discussions of purposeful femininity as a possible form of gender 
transgression. Many feminine-presenting women (cis, trans, and 
nonbinary), some of whom are queer, may construct their gender 
performances as gender play, costumes, or drag performances that 
denaturalize the link between femininity, the male gaze, and men’s 
sexuality. This omission in the literature reflects unacknowledged 
sexist understandings of femininity as natural, passive, and 
complicit with men’s power. Empirical research is needed to 
determine the subversive potential of purposeful femininities; this 
research should also explore whether purposeful masculinity 
(Kimmel 2009) is a possible avenue for dismantling gender 
normativity, though I speculate that purposeful masculinity, with its 
closer ties to men’s dominance, may be less likely than purposeful 
femininity to subvert normative gender and sexuality. To be sure, 
researchers must also attend to femininity’s relationships to power, 
as many white (queer) women may enact femininities that position 
them closer to white standards of beauty and white men’s power, 
whether this is these women’s intention or not (Collins 1990).  
At the most basic level, in order to theorize strategies for 
subverting the ethnosexual regime, one must believe that such 
subversion is even possible. For instance, Foucault provides no 
practical pathway to his utopian ideal of bodily pleasure; in his 
writings, he appears resigned to a world in which the “regulatory 
ideal” of sexuality is permanently inescapable (1990). Indeed, “it is 
hard to base policy recommendations on poststructuralist theory and 
analysis, which often seems far removed from the ‘nitty-gritty’ of 
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lived experience” (Pascoe 2007). Foucault’s theoretical heir Judith 
Butler is impatient with what she calls Foucault’s “slave morality” 
(1990). One of Butler’s strengths lies in her ability to refuse 
poststructuralist philosophy’s more fatalistic and abstract tendencies 
to suggest ways individual actors, who are constructed and enabled 
by the very power relations they seek to oppose, can redeploy power, 
if not get outside of it. At the end of Bodies That Matter (1993), 
Butler movingly suggests turning power against itself “to produce 
alternative modalities of power, to establish a kind of political 
contestation that is not a ‘pure’ opposition, a ‘transcendence’ of 
contemporary relations of power, but a difficult labor of forging a 
future from resources inevitably impure.” In this way, all strategies 
for subversion should be recognized as contextual, provisional, and 
ambivalent, though no less worthwhile for their contingencies. 
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